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FOREWORD 
This report is in fulfillment of Task V of Contract NASW-4065, 
titled "Space Commercialization". The purpose of Task V is to 
evaluate, assess quantitatively, present in usable format, the 
current and expected future competitive status in the commercial- 
ization of space of the two pricipal programs competitive with 
NASA's: the European Space Agency's (ESA) and the program 
sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI)  of Japan. 
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V 
The space progran is mprised of thirteen national programs 
conducted by thirteen countries, plus the European Space Agency's (ESA) 
centralized supranational program. The latter is the subject of this report. 
The total European expenditures budgeted for space, namely the sum of the 
national and supranational programs, are about $2 billion in 1987 or 
approximately 8% of the total US space expenditure, if we include in the 
latter the programs run by NASA, DOD, NOAA and DOE. ESA's expenditures are 
about half of the European total, anounting to about $1 billion in 1987, or 4% 
of the total US space program expenditures, and 12% of NASA's expenditures. 
About seventy percent of =A's program is oriented towards developing 
carmercial uses of space. Thus, despite the relatively small magnitude of 
ESA's cumulative expenditures with respect to NASA's, the funds that ESA 
devotes to space carmercialization is considerably larger than NASA's. 
ESA's definition of what mstitutes space oarmercial programs is broader 
than NASA's. 
Europeans define as OQrmercial, sales by an industry of: i) off-the- 
shelf hardware and software to any space agency, regardless of whether used 
for R&D or for cprational programs; ii) R&D and/or hardware procurements to 
a Exlropean country c A b r  than the country in which the industry =ides, or to 
any enctra-Bnqean country; iii) operatiad space systems to EsA, other than 
systans specifically designated as being scientific or otherwise non- 
ccmnercial . 
ESA recognizes three phases in the progress tmaxds oanercializing a 
space system: i) the m & E  phase-not amsidered camnercial; ii) the 
demnstratiun phase, where users participate in trying out the system-not 
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considered carmercial; iii) the esploitation phase, where users utilize a 
portion of the system's products on a trial basis, for pay. This constitutes 
the onset of the system's clcmnercial usage. If everything wrks, the system 
is eventually turned over to the users. 
ESA's ccmnercial space users, frequently designated by Europeans as 
"private", are not by and large private industries in the US sense. Only 
about 20% of the European industries sufficiently large to participate 
meaningfully in space cannercial endeavors are truly private concerns. The 
remainder 80% are in whole or in part owned by their respective governments. 
Thus they can be induced to some extent to accept govemnt-dictated 
policies, especially regarding space clcmnercial endeavors. 
ESA's camercially-oriented mainliner thrusts are: i) cmnunications, 
including voice, data, video relay and direct broadcast; ii) remote sensing 
of the Earth's resources; iii) the Ariane launch vehicle; iv) microgravity 
experiment carriers; v) microgravity experimentation aimed at generating new 
industrial products and processes. 
In the area of space axumnications, as of mid-1987 , ESA had developed 
and launched 1 demonstration and 5 partially or wholly carmercial 
satellites. Planned for the near term are another 2 cannercial, 1 partially 
carmercial satellites. 
In the rcnmte sensifq field, ESA is developing the ERS-1 danonstration 
satellite, slated for launch in 1989, and to be followed by one or two mre, 
essentially identical versions but oriented carmercially, to provide 
continuity of service. %is is in addition to four meteomlogical satellites: 
one mixed demonstration and carmercial, three wholly "carmercial". ESA's 
EARITWET service does and will oontinue to provide for dissemination of the 
remotely sensed products. 
As regards law st^ vehicles, ESA has developed the Ariane, whose current 
version, Ariane 4 ,  is now sold carmercially as a carrier of satellites into 
orbit . 
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ESA's dcrogravity experiment carrier, aJREcA, proposed to be launched 
fran Shuttle in 1989, to be retrieved six months later, will initially be an 
experimental system. It is planned to become a onmercial endeavor should the 
experimental phase be ccnmercially successful. 
The rnicrugravity prugraa, originally under E A ' S  Scientific Programs 
Department, has in 1984 been transferred to the Space Transportation Systems 
Department. Its budget, that used to be included within the science programs, 
has since 1985 been defined on its m; it increased almxt 80% fran 1985 to 
1986. This is a significant step towards camercialization. 
E A ' S  intent is to convert the microyravity program, as soon as results 
warrant, f m  experimental to cumercial. A level of fundiry for microgravity 
of about $600 million for the four years 1988 thmugh 1992, proposed by the 
European scientific comnunity, is being debated within ESA's Board of 
Directors. 
For the further future lying between the early nineties and 2000, ESA is 
proposing to spend about $7 billion for the aggregate of the above 
cmwrcially-oriented programs, subdivided as follows: 26% for 
telemunications, 31% for developnent of the next generation Ariane 5 
launcher, 22% for Earth Observation, 7% for microgravity (possibly as much as 
12% if pending recarmendations by the scientific cannunity are implemented), 
and 15% for programs related to participation in the US Space Station. 
The basic long-range intent of ESA's progran is: i) to attain, by year 
2000, independenoe fran reliance on the CIS space program; ii) to exploit in 
the interim NASA's infrastructure, technology and money to learn haw to gain 
independence; iii) to continue fostering the mrciality of the space 
program; iv) to foster eqlaymwrt of, and the acquisition of - by, 
European engineers and scientists, to eventually enable Europe to ccmpete with 
the technological leaders, US and Japan. 
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The Jspanese space pacogram is oonducted by two principal agencies. The 
National Space Developnent Agency (NASDA) runs mst of the program and has the 
largest budget; the Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences (ISAS) runs 
the space program's scientific missions. For specialized chores, NASDA and 
ISAS are assisted ad hoc by governmental scientific and engineering 
organizations reporting to various interested Ministries, e.g., Rxt and 
Teleccnmunications. 
The total Japanese space expenditures, including all agencies, are budgeted at 
about $522 million in 1987. NASDA receives the lion's share, in excess of 
90%. The total Japanese space budget is about 6.2% of NASA's, 50% of ESA's. 
Both NASDA and ISAS have openly expressed their disinterest in the comnercial 
uses of space. As such, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), with a budget of about $8 million in 1987, but with a lot of 
influence, exerts the only role in spearheading space carmercialization. 
MITI views space cannercialization quite differently fran the US and 
Europe, and in the same way they look at other Japanese industrial 
endeavors. MITI's carmon sense thinking is based on the fact that Japan 
produces less than 10% of the raw materials necessary to sustain its 
econany. Tb import these, Japan must export sanething in exchange: they found 
the most profitable exports to be finished products characterized by 
moderately high technology, high quality, and large sustained markets. 
To implement this thinking, MITI provides selected industries with seed 
money in the fom of technology contracts, bank guarantees, similar 
capability-fostering mechanisms-all aimed at eventually generating export 
sales; or, alternatively, at developing danestic products that minimize the 
need for imports. 
MITI applies the same thinking to space amnercialization. Hence MITI is 
interested in: 
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o Space programs that are valuable to the Japanese internal 
e m m y  to save on imports, e.g., teleccmnunications to 
circumvent the need to imprt carmunications hardware and 
know-how 
0 Space programs that can assist Japanese industry in 
obtaining "quid-pro-quos" fran other nations, e.g. , remote 
sensing to detect oil fields and trade this knowledge for 
exploratory concessions 
0 Space programs that render Japanese industry proficient at 
selected technologies that can later be turned into saleable 
export items, e.g., Synthetic Aperture Radars 
National prestige is not very important to MITI, except as it can assist 
export sales. "Independence" is not an important issue, as it is in Nope. 
In line with the above-stated policies, MITI considers the principal 
areas of space carmercialization to be: 
-remote sensing of the Earth's Resources 
-microgravi ty 
and additional potential areas to be: 
-launch vehicles 
-telecannunications 
In the area of reante senshq, the key Japanese program, that MITI had a 
major mle in planning, is the Earth Resources Satellite (Em-1). In MITI's 
thinking, this satellite, slated for launch about 1991, will serve to obtain 
oil exploration amcessions in Third Wrld Countries, by trading these against 
SAR findings. 
The Earth Resources Data Analysis Center ( E R S W )  is devoted to 
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investigating pmising petroleum and mineral deposits f m  ERS-1 data and 
processing and distributing ERS-1 products. EFGDAC's funding derives frcm the 
Japanese petroleum industry and fran MITI. ERSDAC is equipped with the best 
image-interpretation technologies now available, and is manned by petroleum 
and mineral geologists, plus data processing personnel. 
'Ib assist its planning in the micrOgravity field, MITI has assembled a 
cadre of Japanese industry exponents. These have so far identified at least 
six pranising micrqravity areas, and are also investigating the desirable 
characteristics of a microgravity experiment carrier. Advanced plans are 
being developed to exploit NASA's Space Station for microyravity research, at 
low cost to Japan. 
As regards launch vehicles, MITI is currently pondering the econanic 
advisability of entering the wrld launcher market, especially in view of the 
already established canpetition on the part of the US and Europe. We believe 
that the outlook for Japanese entry is as yet uncertain. 
We believe that a similar uncertain outlook holds in space 
te~eoaanunications. In fact, recent MITI analyses have shown Japanese DOMSATS 
to be rot oost effective with respect to investing in advanced terrestrial 
systems such as fiber optics, newqeneration camnunications processors. MITI' 
has recarmended that the government place a mratorium on the launch of 
further carmsats. 
In sunnary, the Japanese space onmercialization program, spearheaded by 
MITI, has so far carre up with only one advanced space system, the ERS-1; it 
is investigating the eventual cxrrmerciality of microgravity; has put a brake 
on munications satellites; and is still pondering whether to enter the 
launcher market. 
As regards intent, national prestige and independence are but minor 
issues: MITI plans to follow a strictly business, bottan-line oriented, profit 
mute. In line with this policy, MITI will listen to its own industrial 
advisors as regards comnercial potentials of space; but will also follow 
keenly the outcane of US space axrmercial programs. In particular, the degree 
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of econanic success of the US microgravity program w i l l  guide MITI as to 
whether to " j q  in", or engage i n  a modest program, or abs t a in  a l toge ther .  
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Europe's and Japan's are the two space programs t h a t  mpete with NASA's 
space ccmnercialization program. The objec t ive  of this e f f o r t  is to eva lua te  
and quant i fy  the  ex ten t  of the  competition, i n  order to allow NASA management 
to judge the canpe t i t i on ' s  depth,  i n t en t  and fu tu re  growth. The f i r s t  por t ion  
of t h i s  report concentrates  on the  European program. The second port ion 
addresses the  Japanese program. 
By space cannercia1 programs we mean endeavors aimed a t  fos t e r ing  
p r o f i t a b l e  space ventures.  Examples of these  are: spaceborne remote sensing 
sys tans  t h a t  produce imagery for sale; microgravity platforms t h a t  o f f e r  on- 
board f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  lease; d i r e c t  broadcast  satellites whose air-time is 
saleable to subscr ibers .  In  the  U.S., the  designat ion 0Cmaercia.l connotes 
space ventures that are financed and operated by private m c e r n s - e v e n  though 
t h e i r  e a r l y  proof of concept may be i n i t i a t e d  and funded by U.S. g o v e m n t  
agencies. 
In  Exlrope's case, the d e f i n i t i o n  of "pr ivate"  needs to be expanded to 
include cpmmment-mpprtd enterpr i ses .  This is because of the d i f f e r e n t  
socioeconanic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and political atmosphere preva i l ing  i n  mope. 
In  tern of revenue, t r u l y  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  the U.S. Sense, canprise 
only  about 20% of  the m a n  indus t r i e s  that are s u f f i c i e n t l y  large to 
meaningfully address space carmercial  act iv i t i e s ,  whether as aerospace 
contractors or as onmercial users. The remainder 80% or so large e n t e r p r i s e s  
are i n  one way or another ul t imate ly  owned and financed by govenments,  either 
d i r e c t l y  or through intermediary holding cxmpanies. 
In  the space carmercial  arena,  t h e  case of DOMSATS ( W s t i c  
Cannunications Satellites) e x m p l i f  ies the socioeconanic s t r u c t u r e  typical of 
Europe. 
In  the U.S., WMSATS are paid for, mmaged and p r a t e d  by t r u l y  p r i v a t e  
concerns t h a t  canpete with each other on the open market.  In Europe, the  
s i t u a t i o n  is not as clear cut .  
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For example, one proposal under debate is that Eumpean DOMSATS be cklned 
and operated by an inter-European agency, E"IELSAT, that would be owned 
jointly by the participating governments (ECTELSAT at present is an 
intergovennental organization headquartered in Paris). In this proposal, the 
DOMSAT services wuld be channeled through the P1T's (Post and Telegraph 
agencies), that are non-canpeting, state-owned monopolies (one per country). 
Another proposal is that DOMSATS be amrdinated only by IWTELSAT, and 
owned jointly by EUTELSAT and the participating p?T's. Regardless of 
whichever proposal ultimately wins out, DOMSATS muld still, in the final 
analysis, be owned by the participating European Governments, and would be 
operated essentially as mnopolies. 
In net: U . S .  WMSATS must be profitable; European DOMSATS not 
necessarily so--if they can supply a service considered "socially valuable". 
However, whether financially or socially profitable, they are still termed by 
the Europeans as "private". 
To further clarify the significance of what EUopeans call "private 
industry", we must remember that during the thirties, numerous European 
enterprises (industries, banks etc.) were suffering fran the great 
depression. Rather than let important enterprises disappear, Italy first and 
the other governments later, began purchasing the threatened cmpanies' 
shares. The industries in difficulty thus received an infusicln of needed 
govenrrment cash, in exchange for a portion of their shares: the remainder of 
the shares were still held by the public at large and traded on the s t o c k  
markets. 
Upon becaning part-owners, govenanents began installing representatives 
on the several canpanie's Board of Directors. 
Initially, the fraction of shares purchased by gaverments was relatively 
small, say cn t k  order of 10-20%. time elapsed, this fraction grew,  until 
at present about 80% of the large industries have turned over all or m s t  of 
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their entire packet of shares to their respect ive g o v e m n t s :  thus  becaming 
i n  e s s e n e  govermnent-ownd. 
European government-owned indus t r i e s  do however preseive a semblance of 
"pr ivate"  behavior, i n  that they compete w i t h  each other, prepare t h e i r  own 
p r o f i t  and loss statements ,  pay their am taxes.  The pr inc ipa l  d i f f e rence  
with respect to how US industry operates is f e l t  a t  yea r ' s  end: i f  a 
Covernment-owned e n t e r p r i s e  closes its books " i n  the red", the government 
m a k e s  up the d e f i c i t  and the enterprise continues to operate, on the  grounds 
tha t  doing sp is s o c i a l l y  valuable" when contrasted w i t h  the consequences of 
l e t t i n g  t h a t  industry disappear.  
'Ib achieve as much as possible an "apples-to-apples" m p a r i s o n  of 
cannerc ia l ly-x ien ted  space programs, w e  have subdivided the European 
cannercia1 space endeavors in  the same categories that are being plrsued by 
the U.S. National Space Program, see Chart 1. 
We have segmented the span of cur inves t iga t ion  i n t o  two successive time 
frames. The earlier t i m e  frame r e f l e c t s  historical da ta ;  it begins about 1980 
and extends to 1986. The later t h e  frame extends frun e a r l y  1987 i n t o  as f a r  
i n t o  the  f u t u r e  as European plans have been formulated. The reason f o r  
choosing these bmporal frames is twofold; t he  historical data provide i n s i g h t  
i n t o  the growth of  each progran and furn ish  a gauge as to the magnitude of its 
total funding; whereas the future  plans supply a c a l i b r a t i o n  of the program 
planner's i n t e n t ,  hence of the degree of cnnpet i t ion  t h a t  NASA can expect i n  
t h e  future,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  as regards space onmerc ia l i za t ion  a c t i v i t i e s .  
In  canparing the content  and value of d i f f e r e n t  na t iona l  space programs, 
such as the US and the mropean program, the quest ion that m t u r a l l y  arises is 
"what aught to be the yards t ick  of canparison?" The na tu ra l  tendency and 
f requent ly  used procedure, is to canpare the respective budgets and/or 
m i t u r e s  a t  the ongoing curmmy excharge rates. me r e s u l t  is only 
g ross ly  ind ica t ive ,  because, whereas budgets and expenditures do c o n s t i t u t e  a 
gross yards t ick  of r e l a t i v e  size,  currency exchange rates do mt truly r e f l e c t  
t he  r e l a t i v e  "purchasing pawer" of one currency with respect to another. 
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Moreover, ne i the r  budgets nor purchasing powers t r u l y  re f lec t  a space 
program's qua l i ty ,  i.e., cost /effect iveness  or camnercial p r i ce /pe r fomnce .  
Tb enhance the realism of the cunparison, we have explored the r e l a t i v e  
merits of converting the  budgets and expenditures of the  European programs 
i n t o  U.S. d o l l a r s ,  using three d i f f e r e n t  conversion rates for each year under 
consideration: i) the official foreign exchange quotat ions ; ii) the United 
Nation's Purchasing Fwer Par i ty  (PPP) index, and iii) the "Account ing CJnit" 
(AU) conversion rate. 
As can be seen frun Chart 2, these three a n v e r s i o n  factors d i f f e r  
s ign i f i can t ly .  
The official rates of exchange are genera l ly  the least reliable, because 
they do not reflect the true relative "values" of tm currencies-in our case, 
the dollar versus  a given ax ln t ry ' s  m n e t a r y  uni t .  "his happens because the 
o f f i c i a l  exchange rates are set only in  part by the purchasing powers ex tan t  
within each country: to a large degree, the  exchange is influenced by 
d i f f e r i n g  i n t e r e s t  rates between count r ies ,  varying investment r i s k  
percept ions,  other factors that frequent ly  make one currency mre sought after 
than others, regardless of its in te rna l  purchasing pwer within its country of 
o r ig in .  
The PPP index attempts to a n p u t e  an "ideal" exchange rate, that reflects 
the "value" of an average "package" of goods and se rv ices  i n  each country 's  
i n t e r n a l  market  
me Accounting u n i t ,  or W ,  is a V i t e  rate used by the European 
Space Fgency (ESA) The d i f f e rence  is 
that the PpP applies to individual -tries, whereas the AU i n t e g r a t e s  the 
several plrchasing pwers of the ~nx lp  of anmtries that m t r i b u t e  to ESA's 
budget . 
In  concept, the W is akin tm the Pep. 
Chart  2 i l l u s t r a t e s  the trends of these three indices ( o f f i c i a l ,  PPP and 
AW over the last seven years  for the u.S. and major European coun t r i e s  
engaged i n  space programs. Note the s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rences ,  which, i n  s ~ n e  
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years, are as high as 50%: cunpare f o r  example the  o f f i c i a l  and PPP exchange 
rates f o r  the UK and I t a l y  i n  1984. 
To fu r the r  illustrate the  d i f fe rence  between purchasing powers and 
exchange rates, Chart 3 cunpares typical prices of selected goods and services 
i n  the  U.S. and I t a l y ,  and cunputes theref ran  what the  dollar-lira exchange 
rate a q h t  to be i n  order to purchase equivalent  anount of goods i n  each of 
t h e  two countries.  Remanbering that the  dollar-lira exchange rate in  December 
1986 w a s  about $ l = L i r a  1,350, t he  s i g n i f i c a n t  discrepancy between U.S. and 
I t a l i a n  purchasing powers f o r  the  same type of goods and/or services is 
apparent frcm Chart 3. Fran data such as these w= compute t h a t ,  i n  order  to 
purchase, i n  I t a l y ,  i n  late 1986, a t  equivalent prices, the  sane “breadbasket” 
as is purchased by the average lLnerican family i n  the U.S., the exchange rate 
ought to be about  $1,00=Lira 2,000. This d i f f e r s  frcm the o f f i c i a l  exchange 
rate (Sl.OO=Lira 1,350 in  December, 1986). 
Analogous f ind ings  apply to European count r ies  o the r  than I t a ly .  
W e  note that the monetary conversions indicated above still do not 
r e f l e c t  the key, bottan-line parmeter of interest to policymakers: naanely, 
what is the r e l a t i v e  price/perfomance between canpe t i t i ve  space programs (by 
price/performance w e  mean the  pmgramvs “ef f ic iency” ,  or “what the program 
w i l l  accanplish per dollar spent”) .  
Stated i n  other wrds: haw w e l l  can they a f ford  it? This important 
assessment, however, exceeds the scope of this e f f o r t .  
For the purposes of t h i s  report, the  bottm l i n e  quest ion is: which 
currency exchange ought to be used in  canparing U.S. space budgets with their 
European counterpar t s  on a true “purchasing pwer” basis? 
An exhaust ive answer to t h i s  quest ion requires more in-depth a n a l y s i s  
than is possible i n  t h i s  study. W can however make educated conclusions,  as 
follows. F i r s t l y ,  the o f f i c i a l  exchange rate, see Chart 2, f l u c t u a t e s  too 
widely f r a n  year to year to be of nuch use. Secondly, the  PpP rate, although 
stabler than the o f f i c i a l  exchange rate, s u f f e r s  i n  our case f run  two 
disadvantages: i )  it r e f l e c t s  r e l a t i v e  prices f o r  an “average breadbasket“ - 
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e.g., the  Cbnsumer price Index-rather than r e f l ec t ing  the costs of aerospace 
systems; ii) it applies only to individual  count r ies ,  not to the aggregate of  
the  mropean nat ions pa r t i c ipa t ing  i n  European space pmgrams. By amtrast, 
the Accounting Unit (AU) aggregates t h e  various exchange rates of the  
individual m n t r i e s ,  and is therefore  f a r  easier to use. 
We choose therefore  to employ Accounting Units (Au) as  expressing the  
"value" of European space budgets and expenditures,  because i) the  AU 
in tegra tes  the severa l  na t iona l  p u r c h a s i q  powers, and ii) it is widely used 
i n  the  European space arena,  thus data expressed i n  AU's are the mst 
abundantly ava i lab le .  
Budgetary and expenditure da t a  f o r  the  severa l  ESA space programs are 
presented, both i n  AU's  and i n  dollars, i n  Sect ion 2.0 t h a t  follows. 
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Gaining a thorough understanding of Europe's space program, let alone of 
its carmercial aspects, is a little like trying to categorize the activities 
of our Curmodity Future's market. The mnplications stan fran the fact that 
there are, in Europe, fourteen space programs: thirteen European nations, each 
have their own space program, and moreover contribute to the supranational 
program managed by E A .  
Additionally, sane programs are bilateral, e . g . ,  F'ranco-English, others 
multilateral, e . g . ,  Franm-Geman-Italian--funded in part by E A ,  in part by 
the participating nations. 
Furthemre, the definitions of what constitutes "cQrmercia1" programs 
vary significantly fran those employed in the u.S. 
m e  situation resembles a little the scenario that muld exist if the 
States of the Union each had their own space program, in addition to 
participating in a centralized federal program, with each State -rating 
under different standards, through multiple inter-state cwpcts, and with 
differing goals and aspirations. 
n e  budgetary oonstraints of the present effort require that, instead of 
attmpting b fully unravel the maze, w? address Europe's space program in 
terms of its iqgmgated features, with primary mcentration on ESA's program. 
Chart 4 offers a calibration of the relative magnitudes of the aggregate 
European and U.S. space efforts. All econanic data are in current dollars and 
current W ' s  using official oonversion rates between the W and the dollar. 
See Section 1.0 for the significance of these conversion rates. 
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The data shum r e f l e c t  total space expenditures. In  the U.S. case, these 
are the sum of c i v i l i a n  (=A, NOAA and DOE) plus  military (u.S. Air Fbrce) 
progrim costs; i n  Europe's case, the costs shown apply to c i v i l i a n  programs 
only-because there are as yet no European m i l i t a r y  space programs. Europe's 
expenditures shown i n  Chart 4 r e f l e c t  the sun of the expenditures by ESA and 
by the severa l  na t iona l  space programs. 
Chart 4 provides an ind ica t ion  of the respect ive total &ttnm?nts to 
space ( c i v i l i a n  p lus  military) on the  part of the  U.S. and of Europe. Note 
t h a t ,  when viewed in  terms of total cxxrmittment a t  dollar-AU exchange rates, 
Europe's space budget as a percentage of the U.S. budget has sanewhat 
decreased from about 16 % i n  the  ea r ly  e i g h t i e s  to about  9% current ly .  This 
is due pr imari ly  to the very subs t an t i a l  increase i n  the US DOD budget, t h a t  
has r i s en ,  i n  cur ren t  dollars, to $14.24 Bil l ion  i n  1986. 
W e  note i n  passing t h a t  t he  o n p a r i s o n  of the respec t ive  Us and European 
botdl ccmnittments to space is frequent ly  used by E A  i n  present ing its 
budgets and expendi tures ,  e spec ia l ly  when requesting funds from t h e  
cont r ibu t ing  European governments. 
Aside f m  its pmpaganda value ( " i f  ws want to catch up, you have to 
give us  mre money"), the canparison has i n t r i n s i c  value f o r  the Europeans, 
because they f e e l  that the US military program, even though separate frwn 
NASA's, produces its awn technology sp ino f f s  that sooner or later are 
intmduced in c i v i l i a n  space uses, and eventual ly  lead to o3mTlercial spinoffs 
that are greater than wmld be the case i f  m i l i t a r y  programs d id  not exis t .  
C h a r t  5 canpares the r e l a t i v e  magnitudes of the total European space 
program budgets w i t h  NASA's budget. Note t h a t  the canparison iS sanewhat 
slanted i n  favor  of JUmpe: i n  o the r  wrds, the u o p e a n  budget appears 
propor t iona te ly  sanewhat higher  w i t h  respect to NASA's. This is because t h e  
w a n  Meteorological prugram budget is included i n  the  European total, 
whereas NOAA's and DOE'S budgets (about $360 i n  1986), are not included i n  
NASA's expenditures. 
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Even taking this bias into account, we note that the total EXlro;pean space 
expenditures (ESA plus the national programs) have grown substantially at the 
same pace as NASA's-they are currently about 24% of the NASA expenditures or 
about $2 billion for 1987. This is particularly impressive because these 
expenditures represent a significantly greater strain on EXlropean resources 
than NASA's expenditures do on US resources, thus showirq an earnest and 
growing carmittment to space on the part of the Europeans. 
The nations of Western Europe fund tm distinct type of Space Programs: 
i) the centralized program of the European Space Pgency (ESA), and ii) the 
(thirteen) national space programs of the individual countries. 
The centralized ESA program is the largest in magnitude of expenditures 
and the most significant in terms of centralized direction. It is followed in 
size by France's, next by the Federal Republic of Ciennany's national programs. 
Chart 6 shows the 1986 expenditure distribution between ESA's centralized 
program and the sum total of the individual national programs. It can be seen 
that EA'S expenditures account currently (1986) for better than half of the 
total European space expenditures. 
Chart 7 depicts the respective shares of financial amnittments to space 
made by the several European nations in 1986. It shows the sun of each 
countrie's contribution to FSA, plus the outlays for its own national 
program. We see that the major spenders, in descending order of budget size, 
are France, the FRG, the UK and Italy: together, these f&r axlntries account 
for about 88% of Europe's total space expenditures. 
It is of sune interest lmw the space agency budgets are distributed in 
tern of allocations. 
In a ' s  case, about 10% of the budget is allocated to administration and 
project management, 5 to 7% to intramural R&D, the balance of approximately 
80% to industrial contractors. 
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In the case of the national space programs, industry receives about 60%, 
internal Administration and Project Management about 15%, scientific 
institutions, laboratories and universities the balance 25%. 
European industry can thus look forward to a total space business of 
order 70% of the space expenditures (ESA plus national space programs). This 
is of course in addition to what they sell to space programs in non-European 
countries. Chart R shows the breakdown of =A's 1986 expenditures, that are 
the latest available at the time of this writing. Chart 9 shows the 1985 
expenditures. 
2.2 How does the Bmqpan aamrUnity view the Space (bmnercial Rsiness 
Ib canpare concretely European and U.S. efforts at space 
comnercialization, it is important to set forth a m n  denaninator of 
significance, to allw performing the intermparisons to a cannon "apples to 
apples" yardstick. 
me mropeans &it that current definitions of space onmercialization 
are sanewhat incanplete and occasionally rather nebulous. For the m n t ,  
however, they accept two groundrules: i) the yardstick of measurement of the 
level of carmercialization is represented by the revenues that accrue to 
industry fmn space-related m r c i a l  activities; ii) these pevenues are 
defined as the totdl sales effected by industry in both direct and 
o~lpleaentary carmercial mrkets, where: 
0 Direct markets consist of the pmducticm of oomnercial space 
systems or the supply of armaercial space servioes, e,g,, 
cmnunications satellites, M A N E  launch services. 
0 Canplementary mrkets m represented by the sale of products and 
services that are peripheral to or derivatives of amnercial space 
programs, e.g., space carmunications ground terminals, earth 
mapping and/or meteorological products/services derived frun 
remote sensing satellites, similar. 
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Not amsidered anaercial up to this time (1986) are IMT&E space systems, 
paid for by ESA or by the National PrOgramS, that are precursors to 
operational system. mese mn-mrmcial systems include the following 
principal activities: 
0 ARIANE Laundrers and corresponding launch services funded by ESA 
for purposes of -E and daaonstration (we discuss the meaning 
of "demonstration" later in this report). This included Ariane 1 
activities up to 1984. 
0 ~leanmmicatims satellites that are pnxqerational and that 
an? paid for by ESA, see Chart 11. However, sales of R&D and 
preoperational satellites to non-European governments or to 
European space agencies other than ESA and other than the National 
Pgency of the country in which the selling industry is located, 
are considered canercial. 
0 M m t e  sensing programs that are in the nature of FUYJXE and 
demonstration programs, e.g. ,  SPOT 1 and SPOT 2, German Metric 
Camera for SPACELAB, certain R&D platforms to be launched via the 
U.S. Space Shuttle 
0 AIIGOG activities. mis is a data-relay device that flies 
piggyback on NQAA's Tim satellite. It collects data f m  sea- 
going buoys and relays them back to central stations (one in 
Toulouse, France, the other in Lanham, Maryland) where they are 
processed and conveyed tm users. 
0 SARcioG activities- SAIMOS is a search and rescue systan that 
relays data frun vehicles in peril thmugh satellite to ground. 
0 Use of SPACELAB, and of pre-operational flights of EXIREXA, a 
microgravity platform scheduled to fly about 1989. 
~ o t e  hawever that the sale of products or services tm third parties frun 
these pre-operational systems is accounted for as amnercial. 
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Apart frun the above exceptions, the spaoe mmxcial w e t  is defined 
by the Europeans as canprisiry: 
0 ’Irelecarmunication and Direct Brr>adcast satellites (DE) that are 
operational and whose services are sold for pay--to the public or 
to public agencies, through EUTELSAT or through individual 
country’s PlTs 
0 ~ u n c h  Wicles that are operational and that are amnissioned and 
paid for by any agency, country or private enterprise for the 
purpose of lofting a amaercial payload, e.g., a 
telecomnunications or DBS satellite. This is the case of Ariane 
2,3,4. 
0 Meteomlogy and Earth observation satellites cunnissioned by 
European non-space governmental agencies or by extra-European 
custaners of all types. 
0 Space Serviae Pla-, such as the EURECA m n n e d  microgravity 
platform once it becanes operational, i.e., after it begins to 
accept paying custaners. 
0 OuappleDentary markets: 
- earth surface cannunication terminals (ground, Ocean, 
airbome) 
- terrestrial equipnents, products and services related to 
space-based meteorology, earth observation, navigation, etc. 
- RIYT&E and operational products and services sold to 
private or gwenmental foreign custaners, e.g. sale of 
lasers to NASA for space tracking. 
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A specific example, drawn frun the area of cmmmicatiorrs satellites, 
w i l l  serve to c l a r i f y  these de f in i t i ons .  
The space segment of a oxmunicat ions system that is paid for by ESA for 
€UYI'&E purposes is not considered carmercial .  
A space seyment m i s s i o n e d  for m r & E  prposes, and paid f o r  by a non- 
country, or by a Furopean country other than the one i n  which 
the se l l iny  industry LTsides, is considered ammercial. 
An operational m u n i c a t i o n s  space segment that is cxmnissioned and 
paid for by any lqency or Country is considered cxrrmercial. 
Gcuum3 bermindl off-the-shelf equipnent sold to ESA or to any other 
Agency or Country is amsidered  cumercial. This is s i m i l a r  to OUT GSA 
pol icy.  
(;round ty?nninal developaental (FUYI'&E) equipnent sold to any Agency or 
Country other that ESA and/or the Country i n  which the seller re s ides ,  
is considered amnercial. 
We note that the -pan d e f i n i t i o n  of what c o n s t i t u t e s  space carmer- 
c i a l i z a t i o n  is sanewhat mom concrete  than official US. d e f i n i t i o n s ;  it is 
also considerably broader than cur ren t  U.S. def in i t i ons .  
For example, Europeans do not separate c l e a r l y  "camerc ia l i za t ion"  f r a n  
"pr iva t iza t ion" .  vp to now, there has not been i n  Europe any t r u e  
p r iva t i za t ion  i n  the U.S. sense: namely, the taking over of a public se rv ice ,  
fonnerly performed by government, by a private ocmpdny for a fee-presumably 
a t  less cost than w h a t  it costs the government to perfonn. 
Recently, attempts have been made i n  that d i r e c t i o n  i n  sane European 
coun t r i e s  through the formation of "corporations" to manage c e r t a i n  se rv i ce  
sectors-for example, the railway establ ishment  i n  I t a ly .  These 
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"corporations" are of m r s e  not true and tried private concerns, but 
organizations formed "ad hoc", thus burdened by, and forced to retain, 
existing personnel cadres, and otherwise dependent upon government continuing 
to supply the needed deficit funds, at the vim of the political establishment. 
In the area of space carmercialization, the closest "privatistic" 
organization is ARIANFSPACE. A glance at the roster of shareholders shows 
however that they are represented by Banks and Industries that are in turn 
owned by their respective governments, in addition to a substantial share 
owned by Government Agencies. 
Thus, the private or privatized ARIANESPACE is simply an elaborate 
structure that masks its true nature of a government-owned and government- 
controlled entity. 
Because different frcxn the U.S. definition, it is wrth clarifying what 
the Europeans mean by "demonstration". 
Most space systems that are ultimately intended to be camnercial undergo 
a phase which their sevices are "tested" by prospective clients at ESA's 
expense. This is the case, for example, of newqeneration Onmunications 
Satellites: certain clients, e.g. the m's, are granted selective access to 
the space system, in order to verify performance. upon successful cunpletion 
of the demonstration phase, the systm is gradually turned Over to its 
ultimate users ,  for pay. mis turn-over m o t e s  the onset of the oarmercial 
phase. 
The gradual turn-over is often termed by ESA as the "exploitation" 
phase. As an example, based upon the practice employed for cannunications 
satellites, the user organizations pay agred-upon anounts for the use of a 
stipulated nurnber of satellite channels. The revenue derived fmn the 
exploitation activities, together with other analogous =venues, appears in 
the ESA budget under the heading "Incane frun Third Parties". An idea of the 
magnitude of these "comnercial" revenues is offered by ESA's 1986 financial 
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statement: approximately 105 MAU, equivalent to $76 million at the 1986 
dollar-AU exchange rate or about 8% of total ESA expenditures. These revenues 
f m  external sources are used by ESA as part of its expenditures. 
2.3 Space w r c i a l  Activities in Ehsupe 
2.3.1 Overall 
using the definitions stated in preceding .Section 2.2, Chart 10 presents 
the growth of industrial "space cannercia1 revenues" in Europe. Since this 
market research was performed in 1985, the figures up to 1985 show historical 
values; beyond 1985, they represent estimates. 
Clearly, the definitions set forth in the previous section imply that a 
portion of the revenues designated "comnercial" is funded f m  the European 
space budget--for example, by ESA for off-the-shelf items, or by national 
space agencies other than the country where the seller resides, for R&D and/or 
off-the-shelf items. Above and beyond this portion, the balance is 
represented by sales to European and extra-European governmental non-space 
agencies or private concerns. 
Let us address the FSA space carmercial programs that fall within the 
categorizations shown in Chart 1. 
2.3.2 esR Activities by Progran 
2.3.2.1 
a ' s  mle in space telecarmunications is to perform the functions of 
RJX&E,launch, and in-orbit "demonstration" 
The "demonstration" function includes 
and "exploitation". 
three elements: 
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Testing the performance of the overall (space and ground) 
comnunications systm with a view to assess its ultimate "comnercial" 
performance 
Gathering data on propagation and other physical parameters 
Wrkir-q with established teleccxmrunications user organizations (either 
international organizations such as Imnarsat: or, the State-owned 
PTI"s) to perform live tests of ccmnunications quality, ease of 
access, etc. 
In the latter mle, often called "exploitation", the user organizations 
pay agreed-upon amounts for the use of a stipulated nmber of satellite 
channels. These revenues fran external sources are "reinvested" by ESA as 
part of its expenditures. Note that , despite its RM'&E characteristics, all 
of ESA's space telecannunicatious program is camnercially-oriented, in the 
sense that its intent is to precurse act as precursor for eventual comnercial 
sys tans. 
Chart 11 lists the space telecannunications satellite programs engaged in 
by ESA since the early eighties. A brief description of these follows. 
'Ihe mital lbst Satellite (arS), built by the EXlropean MESH Consortium 
with British Aerospace as prime contractor, was EsA's first telecarmunications 
satellite. Its purpose was to test the performance of' TV, voice and data 
transmission, in mcert with the F'I'I"s of several mopean Countries. OTs-1 
was launched in September 1977 fmn Cape Canaveral by a Delta booster that 
exploded. OI'S-2, launched in May of 1978 f m  Cape Canaveral, also by a 
Delta, w a s  successfully placed in geostationary orbit at longitude loo East. 
The MhRHCS Series, built by British Aerospace as prime mtractor, 
prwides telephone, telex, facsimile and high speed data (56  kbp)  service for 
marithe use to the international organization INMARSAT. 
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The initial MARECS-A, launched in December 1981 fran Kourou by Ariane, 
and positioned in geostationary orbit at longitude 26O West, was used for 
demonstration as we11 as cperationally. MARECS B-1 was lost due to Ariane 
failure. 
MARECS l3-2, launched November 1985 by Ariane 3, is located at longitude 
177O East. The satellite is also used to relay signals fran vessels in 
difficulty. 
The Bxopean Oomrunications Satellite fanily (mS -1,-2,-3,-4,-!5) is 
intended to becune the prototype of the operational European bsats. Built 
by British Aerospace as prime contractor, its service covers Exlrope, the 
Middle East and North Africa with telephone, TV, data, facsimile and telex 
transmission, caputer links and teleconferencing. 
Control of the early ECS's (ECS-l,-2,-3) lies with the state-sponsored 
European organization EUTELSAT (European Teleccmnunications Satellite 
Organization). ECS -1,-2,-3 are not under l Y I T  control because of their 
experimental nature. 
The Earth terminals can be normal gateways as ell as -11, dedicated 
terrestrial terminals. Launch is fran Kourou through Ariane. 
The ultimate intent of the ECS program is carmercial: although 
considerable experimental content was necessarily included in the early 
versions Ecs-1, m - 2 ,  ECS-3. Future satellites m - 4  and -5 a m  expected 
to be fully canercial; who will own and/or control than will depend on the 
results of negotiations between btelsat and the PIT'S of the several 
interested European Countries. 
Olyqus, built by British Aerospace and Selenia Spazio as prime 
contractors, is intended to test advanced telecarmunications technology; 
including : 
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0 'IV broadcast at 12 GHZ 
0 Business transmissions including videoconferencing at 12-14 GHZ 
0 Videoconferencing , educational programs, data and imagery 
transmissions at 20-30 GHZ 
0 Propagation measurements at 20-30 GHZ. 
To be launched in 1988 fran Kourou by Ariane 3, and positioned at 
longitude 19O West, Olympus will, in addition to providing tests and 
danonstration, also serve to relay teleccmnunications data on a paying basis. 
The Mvanoed orbital 'Est *ten (m) is planned to be a large project 
to test and demonstrate further advanced teleccmnunications technologies, 
including use of relatively large antenna structures (upwards to 10 meters), 
high-frequency transmission (20-30 WZ and higher), point-t-point and gateway 
transmission, and other technologies and processes currently being defined. 
Deployment is not foreseen by ESA before 1993. 
The mta IIelay Satellite (m), planned for deployment not before 
1994/1995, is proposed as fulfilling a role closely akin to that of NASA's 
TDIZSS. It is currently approved only as a study project. 
The lard Wile cbnnlnicaticns Satellite (-1 is envisioned by EsA as a 
space system to relay voice and data for mobile comnunications (mobile to 
base, mobile to mobile). 
The program is closely patterned after NASA's Land m i l e  Satellite 
Systm (IMSS), pioneered and spearheaded by NASA's Cunnunications Division 
since about 1976. 
me intent of IMCS is to Serve as a geosynchronous relay station to 
connect land-based vehicles (autanobiles,trucks,trains etc.) and marine 
vessels (pleasure and carmercial boats). 
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The geographic area of coverage is envisioned by ESA as anbracing all of 
Western Europe plus the mediterranean coasts of North Africa and the Middle 
East. 
The operating frequency allocation is currently envisioned to lie in the 
l r 5 0 0  megahertz band; number of channels up to about 200. 
The principal problems facing the LMCSIs current conceptual design are : i) 
limited market, i.e.,small number of mobile systems present in Europe ( this 
is m e  reason why ESA projects LMCS's IOC to 2000); ii) the mall antenna 
diameter specified by ESA (about 3 meters). This causes the corresponding 
footprint to m e r  substantially all of the geographic area of interest, thus 
prohibiting frequency reuse, hence limiting the number of effective channels. 
For these reasons, the oarmerciality of the LMCS as presently conceived, 
is doubtful. We are of the opinion that ESA will reevaluate the program 
incorporating more carmercially-viable specifications, especially if the 
corresponding US program, currently underway with several applications by 
private concerns pending before the FCC, should denonstrate ccxnnercial 
value. This is another example where ESA will attempt to exploit the US and 
UPSA experience, at very little R&D cost to the mropean Carmunity. 
2.3.2.2 lYansportation 
The single space transportation program in which ESA has concentrated is 
the Ariane launcher and related infrastructure. The latter includes the 
Kourou launch site, mission control facilities located at Darmstad, West 
Germany, and worldwide mission support  facilities. The schedule of Ariane's 
ESA activities is stwwn in Chart 12. 
The current generation, up to Ariane 4, consists of urmanned aperational 
I 
ELV's whose basic designs are canplete. 
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Chart 12 shows the total end-to-end program costs incurred for the 
Ariane's m & E  program (Ariane 1): 1,390 MAU f m  inception in 1973 t o  
ccmpletion in 1984. Since the Ariane 1 program mnsisted of RDI?&E and 
Demonstrations,it is not classed as comnercial by ESA. 
Subsequent Ariane generations, beginning w i t h  Ariane 2, were and are 
destined to loft payloads for sale, hence are classed as mmercial. 
A recent forecast of the oarmercial potential of Ariane, performed by ESA 
and ARIANESPACE, is shown in Chart 13. It can be seen that ESA expects Ariane 
to capture about 35% to 43% of the mrld's market of comnercial satellite 
launches in the near term. It should be noted however that the market 
represented by the launch of EXlropean satellites is substantially a captive 
market. This is because of the European policy stating that all member 
nations of ESA, and ESA itself, mst use M A N E  in launching their satellites, 
unless i) such a launch is not possible due to the special nature of the 
payload, e.g., EURECA, which must be periodically retrieved in orbit ,hence 
must be launched by Shuttle; or ii) non-Ariane launchers offer a 
substantially lower price-currently set at 15% below Ariane's price. 
If we subtract the captive European market fran the figures shown in 
Chart 12, Ariane's non-European world market share m l d  be less, but still 
impressive: 24% in the medim capture hypothesis, 30% in the high or 
optimistic hypothesis. 
A mre capable vehicle, the Ariane 5 ,  slated for first launch on or about 
1994, is currently in the process of design and limited' developnent. The 
Ariane 5 will be man-rated, thus capable of lofting manned spacecraft such as 
the Hem minishuttle, whose early study phases a= currently being funded by 
several of Europe's National Space programs, and m y  be expanded in the future 
with ESA participation. 
Ariane 5 is viewed by the EZlropeans as a major steppiq stme Wards the 
goal of independence fmn other spa- programs, notably the US program. 
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We also see f m  Chart 12 the significant, by European standards, 
disbursements effected towards the construction of the two launch sites in 
French Guyana, Koumu 1 and Kourou 2 (also known as ELA-1 and ELA-2 1. 
The last entry on Chart l2,labeled "Ariane User Support",is particularly 
significant fran the perspective of space cunmercialization. Its purpose is 
to assist Ariane carmercial users to cope with the mplex procedure of 
accomnodating their particular payload to Ariane's launch configuration and 
launch requirements. 
We note that this policy of "free" assistance diverges significantly fran 
NASA's policy with respect to Shuttle, in that Shuttle users currently have to 
foot the expense of accarmodating their payload to Shuttle's mfiguration and 
requirements. Carmercial US suppliers of ELV services will also be impacted 
by the existence of this "free" assistance: this is because payload 
accamrodation in U.S.  carmercial ELVIS is borne by the custaner, either as a 
direct expense or whether included in the final price. 
At present, the budgeted line iten "Ariane User Support" is planned to 
extend to 1988. All indications are that it will be cmntinued--if rot under 
the ESA aegis, then under the sponsorship of CNES, the French Space Agency, 
that has already funded a rxldget line item for Ariane assistance activities. 
ESA's role in the earth observation program is to spearhead the 
develwnt of earth-observirq spa- systems, and t k  utilization of their 
derivative products. Member nations of ESA are encouraged tm spin-off their 
own earth observation programs: thus far, France has done so with their SPOT 
system; *st Germany with their SPAS-01 pallet that did accarmodate within the 
Shuttle. West Gennanyvs Metric Camera has flown on Shuttle successfully. 
As regards the products of m t e  sensing system, ESA has set up the 
m m  organization to sell them cannercially. S A ' S  long-term objective is 
to attain a sufficiently large wnsistency of paying "custaners" to justify 
FSA's current developnents. 
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Future Meteorological space Systems, i.e., the series, are defined by 
ESA as amnercial- because their products are expected to be "sold" by ESA to 
weather organizations of the several EXlropean mntries. 
The sequence and funding of FSA's earth observation programs is shown in 
Chart 14. A sumnary description of the several programs follows. 
The lUmpean Raaote Sensirq Satellite (E) program, authorized in 1982, 
prime contractor Cornier, is intended to provide all-weather capability. 
The three active sensors: Synthetic Aperture Radar (SARI ,  Scatteraneter, 
Altimeter, operate in the microwave range. 
The first instrument, a single-frequency Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
operating at 6.3 GHz, provides a maximm resolution of 30 x 30 meters over an 
80 kilometer wide swath, or lower resolutions over a wider swath (up to 400 
kilaneters). Revisit interval is 3 days. The SAR can be used as a 
scatteraneter for measuring direction and dimensions of waves. The SAR is 
being built by Marconi, Dornier and Ericsson. 
The second instrument, being built by brnier and Ericsson, is a 
scatteraneter for measuring direction and speed of surface winds. 
m e  thi rd instnrment, by Selenia spazio, is a radar altimeter -rating 
at 13.7 GHz to measure wave height tr, a toleran- of 0.5 meters, plus lard and 
ice toposraphy. 
"he satellite altitude will be measured periodically by a ground-based 
laser system, with reflectar located on the spacecraft. 
ERFl is planned for launch frun Koum by Ariane in 1989, onto a sun- 
synchronous, 675 kilaneter orbit. ERS-2, planned for launch in 1992, will be 
essentially identical to -1, and will provide continuity of service to the 
USerS. 
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The Advanced Irrnd Applications Satellite (AI[As) is still undergoing 
def in i t ion .  very l i k e l y ,  its m i s s i o n  and sensor cmplement w i l l  r e f l e c t  
NASA's Earth Observation System (Eos) deve lopen t s .  A school of thought i n  
Europe holds t ha t  the t w o  programs ought to be merged, depending upon t h e  
degree of NASA' s "moperat iveness" . 
I n  the area of Meteosats, ESA launched Meteosat 1 i n  1977 and Meteosat 2 
i n  1981. Both are almost iden t i ca l  to NOAA's GOES. 
I n  1983, an in te rna t iona l  organization called EUMETSAT ( European 
Meteorological Satellites) w a s  created, w i t h  twelve count r ies  as s igna to r i e s ,  
f o r  t he  purpose of e s t ab l i sh ing ,  maintaining and operating European 
Operational meteorological satellite systems. ESA's and EUMmAT's j o i n t  p lan  
encompasses three phases: 
Launch by Ariane 4 i n  1987 of Meteosat P2, e s s e n t i a l l y  another copy of 
GOES. 
Launch, between 1988 and 1990, of three satellites of the  Series, 
planned f o r  operation through 1994/5. 
Planning of an advanced program, called Meteosat 2000, f o r  t he  post-1995 
era. 
is the European network for the acquisition, pre-processing, 
archiving and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of m t e  Sensing data, including mteo data. Data 
is acquired and pre-processed a t  four  ground stations located respectively a t  
Fuc im ( I t a l y ) ,  Lannion (France),  Kiruna (Sweden), and Maspalanas (Canary 
Islands). The products a= sold to i n t e re s t ed  users ,  following a p a t t e r n  that 
is very s imi l a r  to t h a t  o r i g i n a l l y  es tab l i shed  i n  the  US by t he  EFO!S Lhta 
Center. 
2.3.2.4 Uicrogravity 
In  its e a r l y  phases, beginning i n  the  latter part of the 1970's, 
micmgravity was addressed by ESA a t  the s c i e n t i f i c  research level. Since 
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1983, microgravity activities have been classified by ESA as amrclrrridl 
plrecursors. 
Subsequent to this reclassification in 1984, microgravity activities have 
been transferred to, and are currently managed by ESA's Space Transportation 
Systans department, rather than by its predecessor , the Scientific Programs 
Department. Correspondingly, beginning 1985, the microgravity program, that 
used to be included in the science programs, has received its am separate 
budget. 
Early studies by several of ESA's manber nations, supplemented by about 8 
flights of the Texus ballistic rocket (financed by ESA jointly with West 
Germany's National Program, and including 35 short-duration experiments) 
constituted the early program, which had spent about 46 MALJ of S A ' S  fund5 by 
198 5. 
These activities culminated with the Spacelab flight of Novanber 1983 
(whose m & E  and manufacturing costs are above and beyond the 46 MW spent for 
studies and experimentation). As seen by cunparing Chart 9 with Chart 8, the 
funding of the microgravity progran has been increased by almost 80% fran 1985 
to 1986. 
The follow-on to Spacelab is the retrievable carrier EURECA, to be flown 
in Shuttle about 1988, designed to be off-board& and to be later retrieved by 
the Orbiter after a lapse of about 6 mths. Microgravity experimentation is 
EURECA'S primary goal. EURECA's first flight, planned for 1988/9, will carry 
microgravity facilities improved over those flown on Spacelab; it is slated to 
perform sane 29 microgravity experiments. 
primed by MBB/EW, EURECA weighs 4,000 kg (8,800 lbsj, of which 1,000 
kg is represented by the experimental payloads: solar panels provide 5.4 
kilowatts of electric power. The schedule and financing for microgravity and 
EURECA are shown in Chart 15. 
a ' s  further plans for microgravity developnent are: 
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Par t i c ipa t ion  i n  NASA's Space Sta t ion  
Deployment and exp lo i t a t ion  of the Columbus Space Sta t ion  Module 
(mostly to be funded by EXlropean National Space pmgrams) 
Developnent of the  manned Hermes mini-shuttle (still i n  the e a r l y  
s tudy phase),  to be launched by Ariane 5 about 1996 and t h a t  is 
planned to represent  t he  f i r s t  major s t e p  towards European 
independence f r a n  the  US i n  the  space arena; eventual ly ,  the 
developnent of au all-European small space s t a t i o n ,  still p r e t t y  
much i n  the  " t a l k i n g "  stage. 
Whereas the microgravity experimentation program, as d i s t i n c t  f r a n  the  
developnent, manufacturing and launch of E;uREcA, has t h u s  f a r  been r e l a t i v e l y  
modest (a total of 46 MAU spent  through 1985), s t rong pressures  are being 
exerted on ESA by the  s c i e n t i f i c  user oamnunity f o r  increasing the prcgram's 
scope and funding. 
An expenditure l e v e l  of 200 MAU per year f r a n  1988 through 1992, for a 
total of  800 MAU,was recarmended by the s c i e n t i f i c  cumuni ty  and is being now 
debated wi th in  ESA's board. This funding m u l d  mer s t u d i e s  and 
experimentation, including experimental equipnent and launches. 
ESA expects that the  microgravity PTOgram's ultimate ormnercial fallout 
would include three major areas: i) improved i n d u s t r i a l  materials; ii) 
improved indus t r ia l  processes f o r  generat ing improved materials; 'iii) 
h p m v d  biological materials and corresponding i n d u s t r i a l  processes. 
2.3.3 Lmg-range ESA planned activities 
The ESA programs shown thus f a r  are approved and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f i rm 
(except  f o r  the supplemental 800 Mlul funding for microgravity).  For the 
longer tenn, encanpassing the decade of the n ine t i e s ,  ESA is planning 
add i t iona l  p m g r m .  Chart 16 dep ic t s  S A ' S  forecasted expenditures f o r  these 
programs. With mspect to mart 16r  note that: 
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1) to the forecasted program expenditures of almost 10 Billion MAU ( $7.1 
Billion of 1986 dollars) must be added the expenditures by the several 
National Space programs, that will roughly amunt to an equivalent figure: 
yielding a total European outlay of about 20 Billion MAu, or about S14 Billion 
(in 1986 dollars). 
2) The item "in-orbit infrastructure" consists of that portion of 
infrastructurx that ESA estimates m l d  contribute directly to comnercially 
oriented programs. This includes principally: i) participation in the NASA 
Space Station activities; ii) Studies on the H e m  minishuttle; iii) Studies 
on an autonunous mmpean space Station (as yet only in hte stage of advanced 
discussion). 
2.4 Intent 
The growing magnitude of the EXlropean space program and the direction of 
the planned future program, portend a serious carrnittment to space. The 
currently proposed future space programs show that much of the expected Qrowth 
will be dedicated to carmercial endeavors. This conclusion, based on the bare 
facts of the budgets, is augmented and made more precise fran public 
statements and provate discussions with exponents of the space progran and of 
European industry. 
Following w attempt to distill the sense of the intent of the EXlmpeans in 
space. 
zndependerroe by 2000. 'Ihe banner wrd "independence" mnotes in the 
European's mind the elimination of reliance upon foreign space programs, m t  
particularly the CIS program. It connotes a scenario in which Europe will have 
substantially the same classes of space capabilities as the Us, although on a 
smaller scale. These capabilities an? envisioned by the Europeans as 
ultimately including: 
A self-sufficient launch site 
Capability for manned space flight 
Capability for deploying their own infrastructure, up to and 
including a space station fully suitable for space 
experimentation 
Industrial capability of producing their am space vehicles 
and payloads. 
This attitude, that departs in a major way fran the intent of a decade 
ago, has been generated, according to European statements, by "lack of 
cooperativeness" on the part of NASA. Rincipal canplaints by Europeans 
are: i) NASA has allegedly barred use of the Delta launch vehicle for 
European launches in the late sixties and through the seventies--this forced 
the Europeans to develop Ariane; ii) the Shuttle's delays have allegedly 
caused delays in deployment of European spacecraft; a frequently adduced 
example is Olympus. The delays have caused budgetary overruns to ESA and to 
sane of the European national programs; iii) results f m  spacelab have been 
disappointing and late, due to NASA's alleged lateness in delivering data; 
iv) NASA's policy of free dissemination of m t e l y  sensed data has impeded 
West Gemany's flight of SPAS. "NASA will work with us when it is convenient 
to thm, oppose us otherwise". 
In the writer's opinion, while the above allegations (regardless of 
whether true or false) have contributed to the trend towards independence, a 
deeper mtivation is the Ebropean's desire to be "reckoned" as a space power. 
Exploit N&A in the interim. The intent is to use NASA's infrastructure 
(Shuttle, Space Station), technology and money to learn how to gain 
" independence". 
For the period 1987-2000, the plan is to: 
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Take advantage of Shuttle and Space Station by contributing little m e y s  
and dmandiry equal benefits. 
Capitalize on the experience thus yained at low cost to learn as much as 
possible towards achieving the goal of independence. 
Note in fact frm Chart 16 the mlatively very low level of expenditure 
planned for the program of "In-orbit Infrastructure", that in essence means 
contributions to the Space Station. 
Onmaemiality is the name af the gae. The structure of the proposed 
future ESA programs shows major emphasis on carmercial uses of space -- 
including the infrastructure mcessary to insure deployment and exploitation 
of cunnercia1 space systans, i.e., launch vehicles. 
P'ostering "ech ecPplCrYment ad the axpisition of krm+huw. In 1986, 
about 20,000 industrial Aerospace wrkers were employed throughout Europe 
thanks to =A's and the several National Space programs. Additionally, the 
ESA progran anploys about 2,000 in-house personnel. These employment levels 
represent a wlc~ne addition to brope's traditionally job-hungry technical 
constituency. Additionally, the intent of ESA planners is to umrade the 
technological level of European engineers, to enable them to eventually 
develop the technology needed to cunpete w i t h  the more advanced nations, e.g. 
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Official Rate of Exchange, average for the year 
Purchasing Rwer Parity Index 
Accounting Unit, average for the year 
Not yet officially available 
ITALY FSR 
LIRAS 
0 PPP Au - - -  
856 759 0.75 
1,137 825 0.70 
1,353 909 0.93 
1,519 1,001 1.02 
1,757 1,070 1.12 
1,909 - 1.37 
1,300 - 1.37 
Source: For official exchange rates, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 









113 Average Highway 
T o l l ,  Fer Mile 
0.021 
Household Electr ic i ty ,  
Fer KWH ( 1 )  
.06 26 0 
Overseas Call u.s.- 
I t a ly  and vice-versa, 









Car Radio Telephone , 
Basic Service, per Month 
11.00 
A i r f a r e ,  W n d  Trip, 
mrist Class, 1,000 
m i l e s  each way 
400 1 ,200,000 
Pound Steak, US ox>ice, 
per Lb. 
2.20 10 ,000 
Spaghetti, Family 
Ouality, Per Ib. 
0.50 8 50 
Beer, 12 O Z . ,  at 
Medim W a l i t y  Bar 
1.25 3 I 000 
(1) 
to purchase, i n  Italy, the  good or service called out in  the f i r s t  column. 
This m l m  shows what the Qllar-lira rate of exchange ought to be in  order 
( 2 )  
h p  sentice. 










7,668 1 267 16.5 947 
9,165 1 ,537 16.8 1,080 
11,860 1,402 11.8 1,315 
15,321 1 396 9.1 1,427 
17,060 1 , 516 9.1 1 ,699 
20 , 368 1 304 6.4 1,779 
22,091 1 ,882 8.5 2 579 
23 p 550 2 ,021 8.6 2,769 
Notes : 
(1) "Total u.S." includes c iv i l ian  (MA, NQAA, DOE) and USAF space programs. 
(2) "Tbtal Europe" includes the sun of E A ' S  and of a l l  national space program 
( 3 )  
( 4 )  Total European program Expenditures, as a percent of total  Us space 
expenditures. 
Dollar-to-W equivalent rates of exchange for each year shown, see Chart 2. 
expenditures. 
me figures for 1987 are budgeted expenditures 
Source: Official  US and ESA data. 
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4,340 1,267 29.2 947 
4,877 1 , 537 31.5 1,080 
5,453 1,402 25.7 1,315 
6,146 1,396 22.7 1,427 
6,385 1 516 23.7 1,699 
7 500 1,304 17.4 1,779 
7 ,764 1,882 24.2 2,579 
8,400 2,021 24.1 2,769 
Notes: 
(1) "Total Fxlrope" includes the sum of ESA'S and of all national space program 
expenditures. 
( 2 )  Dollar equivalent rates of W fo r  each year, see Table 1-1. 
( 3 )  lbtal  European Progran Expenditures as a percent  of NASA's expenditures. 
The f igures  fo r  1987 are budgeted expenditures. 
Sources: Official US and ESA data. 
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I t a l y  
The Netherlands 
Belgium 










(1) "All Others" includes: Derrmark, Spain, Swden, Switzerland, Ireland, 
( 2 )  Manbers m rounded to nearest integer .  
Norway, Mstria. 
Source: Cunputed frun European Space D i r e c t o r y ,  1986, Eurospace, Paris, 
France. 
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ADM IN I STRAT IcrJ 8.4% 
SCIENCE 11.2% 
SPACE STATION/HILTPOWLS 13.5% 
SPICE "SKIRTATION 27.6% 
EARIli aBsWVATION 11.2% 
TJ3MXWWICATIONS 24.9% 










TOTAL EXPENDITURES: 1,367 MAU = $ 998 Million 1986 




canputed from"Forward to t h e  Future" by ESA, Synelog, Nris, 


















'IWI'AL EXPENDITURES: 923.8 MALI = $674 MILLION 1986 DOLLAfzs 
I t m  listed in Type are those oriented towards space amnercialization 
Source: ESA Annual Report 1985 
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YEAR 
1980 51 68 
1981 64 91 






1985 647 474 
.....................**..........*......*.......*.........*.**....*..... O O . . . . . . . . . . .  






(1) "Current" means dollars taken at their value i n  the year shown i n  the 
first colm. Also known as "then dollars". 





























(1) Total end-to-end progrim costs 




















The Wyclopedia of !@ace Satellites, by G i O V a M i  Caprara, 
Dis t r ibu ted  by Crown Publishers, Inc. 
me Future of Satellite Carmunications in mrope, by Andrea Camso, 
D i r e c t o r  General of Eutelsat 
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A R W  1 RIJT&E D 
ARIANE 1 JXMONSTRATION D 
ARIANE 2-3 C 
ARIANE 4 C 
ARIANE 5 C 
KOUROU 1 cT)EJSTRUCI'ION D/C 
K o u w x l  2 CONSTRUCTIC3l C 










84 4 27 
(1) 142 
( 2 )  417 
( 3 )  
84 127 




( 3 )  As above for ( 2 )  
Will continue as the market requires- Final phaseout probably 1990-91 
As above for (1) , but f ina l  phaseout not foreseeable at this time 
Sources: ESA Annual Reports, 1982, 83, 84, 85, 86. 
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ESA'S COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED EARTH OBSERVATION PROGRAM 
D = DEMO : C = COMMERCIAL 
SPACECRAFT CATEGORY IOC LIFE END COST TO COMPLETION -
( MAU ) 
E R S - 1  . D 89 92 58 4 
ERS-2  D/C 9 2  96 630 
ALAS D/C 9 5  98 650 
METE0 P2 D/C 87 91 145 
MO- 1 C 88 92 
MO- 2 C 89 93 
MO- 3 
EARTHNET 
--- N o t  applicable 
C 90 95 
-- C 80 
425 
Source: ESA Annual Reports 1982, 83, 84, 85, 86 
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EURECA 
SPACECRAFT ( 1) D/C 
EARLY 
MICRCGRAVITY 





- = Unforeseeable a t  t h i s  t i m e  
(1) Primarily a Microgravity experiments carrier 
(2) Microgravity experimentation only, as d i s t i n c t  frun space f l i g h t  h a r d w a r e  costs. 
(3) 
to 50 MAu/year. A funding level of 200 MAU/year, total 800 Mw f m  1988 
thmugh 1992, to including s t u d i e s  and space f l i g h t  h a r d w a r e ,  was recarmended 
by the European s c i e n t i f i c  cunnunity. This is cur ren t ly  under debate within 
S A .  
This was cost f m  inception through 1985. Program is a m t i n u i n s  a t  40 
Source: ESA Annual Reports 1982, 83, 84, 85, 86. 
Private bmnunications. 
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3 ,000 2,190 LAUNCHEM 87-97 300 
COMMUNICATIONS 87-99 210 2 520 1 ,840 
I N 4 R B I T  I N F M S T R U C I U R E  89-94 300 1 , 500 1,095 
MICROGRAVITY (2) 87-95 80 640 467 
EARTH OBSERVATICN 87-97 210 2,100 1,533 
mALs 1,100 9,760 7,125 
(1) Averages the (smaller) expenditures of study and developnent phases with 
the (larger) cutlays of manufacturing and deployment phases. 
(2) Includes hardware and experimentation. 1985 request by Scientific 
Cannunity is for an increase to 200 M/year: "his is not yet appraved. 
Source: Assembled f m  various ESA publications and private camnunications. 
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3.1 Introauct ion 
We have seen i n  preceding Section 1.0 t h a t  comparisons between the  
expenditures of space programs mounted by d i f f e r e n t  na t ions  need to be 
ef fec ted  with caut ion i n  order to achieve a t r u l y  representa t ive  meaning. 
Similar ly  to what we presented i n  the case of Europe, Chart 17 shows the  
h i s t o r i c a l  rates of exchange, both o f f i c i a l  and PPP, between the  dollar and 
the  Japanese yen. Analogously to what w? observed f o r  the case of Europe, w e  
note the high degree of f luc tua t ion  i n  the  dollar-yen exchange rate. The 
Japanese space budgets are quoted i n  Japanese yen; the o f f i c i a l  value of the  
yen va r i e s  with respect to the dollar; thus the  meaning of Japanese space 
expenditures,  i f  converted d i r e c t l y  i n t o  dollars, would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
distorted. 
The PPP w u l d  provide a b e t t e r  yardst ick,  except t h a t  it is based upon a 
canparison of Consmer Price Indices (CPI 's) ,  r a t h e r  than on Aerospace Price 
Indices.  This w u l d  still induce scme distortions. 
What is then a proper method of conversion? Fortunately,  ESA provides 
t h i s  for us ,  because they do ax lve r t  the Japanese space expenditures i n t o  
AU's, and they do publish the  corresponding data .  Thus we can use the  
expenditure data given in W ' s  and m n v e r t  the W back i n t o  dollars using the 
Au-to-cbllar exchange rates sham i n  Chart 2. 
Simi lar ly  to what happens i n  the US and Europe, Japan's space progran is 
conducted by mre than one government Pgency. 
However, whereas the o f f i c i a l  roles and missions of the seve ra l  Japanese 
Space Agencies are reasonably c l e a r l y  defined, their i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are 
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q u i t e  arnplex: mreover the  i n t e r n l a t i o n s h i p s  are mt always f ixed,  but are 
apt to s h i f t  frun space program to space program, and to vary w i t h  t i m e .  
Further,  non-space agencies are asked to participate i n  c e r t a i n  
designated programs side by side with the o f f i c i a l l y  chartered space agencies,  
whenever their expe r t i ze  is thought by the supervisory organizat ions to be 
par t i cu la r ly  useful .  This adds another l aye r  of canplexi ty  to the o v e r a l l  
space program * s organ i za t ion. 
Another a m p l i c a t i n g  f ea tu re  pecul ia r  to the Japanese Space program is 
t h a t  the report ing s t r u c t u r e  of the Space Agencies is replete w i t h  "dotted 
l ines" .  The agencies receive programnatic and technical  inputs  f r a n  var ious 
Minis t r ies ,  Cmmissions, Academic Bodies-and, s ince  about 1983,they also 
rece ive  inputs f run  especially-formed Industry Associations. 
As a rule these inputs  are genera l ly  taken q u i t e  s e r ious ly  by t h e  
r ec ip i en t  q e n c i e s :  their space programs are shaped accordingly. 
While a l l  t h i s  may appear sanewhat confusing to the American m i n d ,  
accustaned to w e l l 4 e f i n e d  assignments and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  it is oonsonant 
with the Japanese "modus operandi" of management by consensus: l i s t e n  to 
everybody, make every group participate i n  dec is ions ,  t a k e  recarmendations 
ser ious ly .  As such, the  established Space Pgencie 's  charters are q u i t e  
elastic and should be in te rpre ted  with a gocd dose of f l e x i b i l i t y .  
The m e n a n e n t  Agencies t h a t  are the p r i n c i p a l  o f f i c i a l  players i n  the 
Japanese Space program are: 
0 Ihe National De\Felopaent Agwrcy ( N U S X ) .  S imi la r ly  to NASA, W D A  
reports d i r e c t l y  to the Cabinet and perfonns its own planning: bu t  
receives  strong inputs  f m n  other execut ive and advisory bodies. 
Pr inc ipa l  among these are: 
The Science and Technology Pgency (STA). 
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The Ministry of Transport (MT),in the area of launch system 
developnent. 
The Ministry of mst and Telecmunications ( M P I ' )  in the field 
of carrnunications and broadcast space systems. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
NASDA enjoys by far the largest budget among Japanese Space 
Agencies. Its stated charter is the =search, developnent, deployment 
and mission control of all classes of space systems, to except for 
certain designated scientific missions. 
The National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) assists NASI34 on request: as 
an example, they recently provided technical expertize in developing 
UIX systems for launch vehicles. 
o The Institute of Space and Astronautical Scienoes (ISAS). ISAS was 
founded in 1970 as part of the University of Tokyo under an acronym 
that meant originally "Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science". 
Re4rganized under the current name (with the same acronym) in 1981, 
ISAS is an agency of the Ministry of Science,Education and Culture. 
Its charter is dedicated to space science. 
ISAS'S budget oscillates as a function of the programs undertaken; it 
did reach a peak of about $50 million in 1978, and reached a low of 
about $7-$8 million in 1986. 
ISAS' budget is occasionally augmented by contributions fran other 
agencies, either in funds or in the form of personnel loans. 
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ISAS' primary purpose is to achieve a cons is ten t  space science e f f o r t ,  
protected f m  the d is rupt ion  po ten t i a l ly  caused by other high-risk 
space endeavors. 
ISAS develops its m s m a l l  launchers and operates its rn launch 
cen te r  a t  Kagoshha. 
ISAS is charged occasional ly  to omrd ina te  scientific endeavors w i t h  
other Space Agencies and w i t h  i ndus t r i e s  interested i n  space 
ccrrmercialization. 
In  this connection, ISAS has r o w  the role of coordinating a 13- 
industry team, i n  which MITI is also represented, forming a body 
c a l l e d  the " I n s t i t u t e  for an Unmanned space Experiments Platform"-a 
proposed carrier for microgravity experiments. 
o The Ministry of International and Irdustry (MITI). Most of 
MITI'S o f f i c i a l  charter is to f o s t e r  the health and m p e t i t i v e n e s s  of 
Japanese industry,  including of m u r s e  the Aerospace industry.  
As explained i n  mom detail later i n  t h i s  report , MITI's b n p r t a n t  
role is to plan which indus t r i a l  sectors ought to be "pushed" f o r  best 
r e s u l t s  to the Japanese e m m y .  As such, MITI, while not d i r e c t l y  
operating i n  space, is the principal force to be reckoned with as 
regards i n t e n t  and o v e r a l l  t h r u s t  i n  the carmercial izat ion of space. 
Other organiza t ions  t h a t  play a s i g n i f i c a n t  mle i n  shaping the 
Japanese space progran are: 
o The S p a 3  Activities ion (S). N o t  a l i n e  organizat ion,  but 
report ing d i r e c t l y  to the Cabinet, SAC is the core organiza t ion  t h a t  
p lans  and inf luences the d i rec t ion  of Japan 's  space program. Its job 
is to "guess right" as to what other na t ions  w i l l  be doing i n  space, 
and what Japan ought to do to keep up. SAC is the Pgency with the 
strongest say  i n  recatmending space budgets to the Cabinet. 






As regards the ocmnercial and/or econanic aspects of the Japanese 
space program, SAC receives strong inputs f m  MITI. 
The Science and lkchnology Asency (m) is approximately analogous to 
our National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering 
ccxnbined, but with appreciably stronger voice. Its principal job is 
to direct the efforts of ISAS: it also has a voice in the applications 
aspects of the space programs. 
The National Aerospace Labaratary (NAL), the prime Japanese 
aeronautical agency, is brought to bear onto specialized aspects of 
the space program, such as developnt of LOX systems and studies of 
aerodynamic reentry ( NAL is currently testing models of a minishuttle 
for  possible developnent of a mnned capability). 
The Electmtechnical Laboratcxy (J3It), an organ of MITI, is brought to 
bear on particular aspects of the space program: principally on the 
design of carmunications satellites and the evaluation of their 
performance. 
The -io IIpseardr Iabaratary, an organ of the Ministry of m t  and 
Telecarmunications, participates in the design and test of 
carmunication satellites. 
Industrial arganizations. Since about 1982-83, Japanese private 
industry has becane deeply involved in the long range planning of the 
space program. This they acocmplish by forming appropriate 
organizations, preeminent anong which are: 
-l%e mtitute for im upanned space BsperiEnts Plaffonn. 
Created under the auspices of ISIS and MITI, its purpose is to 
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-study and plan an industrial space platform to perform 
microgravity experimentation. Membership embraces 13 canpanies 
-The Japanese Federation of ' c  Oqanizations, under the 
auspices of MITI, has the objective of stimulating Japanese 
industrial awareness of the space program and of its market 
opportunities. Membership is 94 companies. 
-The Society of Japanese lkxwpace Oampanies, Inc., under 
MITI's and NASDA's auspices, with 142 member canpanies, is 
concerned with investigating ways and mans whereby Japan can 
use space technology to develop future, long-term international 
markets . 
-The JAPEX consortium, under MITI's auspices, is formed by the 
Japanese oil exploration enterprises. Its current interest in 
space is to investigate the use of remotely sensed data to 
improve the probability of success in the search for petroleum 
deposits world-wide, with emphasis on Third Wrld Countries, 
especially those sited geographically within the Pacific Basin. 
Superficially, these industrial organizations appear to be counterparts 
of our own industrial organizations, such as the Aerospace Industry 
Association (AIA).  In practice, their role in shaping the future 
orientation of the Japanese Space program is considerably mre 
influential. 
Similarly to what we presented for the mmpean space program, we axnpare 
in C h a r t  18 the relative magnitudes of the total Japanese space progran (sum 
Of the expenditures by all Japanese agencies) and the overall US program 
(civilian and military). 
We note that the total Japanese program arrounts now to a little over 2% 
of the total (civil plus military) Us program. 
Since there is no military Space program in Japan, a mre germane 
canparison can be had fran Chart 19, that canpares the Japanese space 
expenditures with those of NASA and ESA. It  can be seen that the total (a l l  
agencies)  Japanese space expenditures amount now to approximately 6% of 
NASA's, 50% of ESA's expenditures. 
The E l a t i v e l y  limited mgn i tude  of their space budget has forced the 
Japanese to be q u i t e  s e l e c t i v e  i n  t h e i r  choice of which space programs to 
pursue. This may represent  a s t r eng th  r a t h e r  than a weakness, because it has 
forced the Japanese to think through a rather meticulous planning processI 
that has fostered a s t e a d i l y  expanding space program with but  l i t t le  waste. 
The breakdown of N U D A ' S  1986 expenditures is shown in Chart  20. 
3.3 Haw do the Japanese view Space Oornaercfalization 
Space a m n e r c i a l i z a t i m  is viewed d i f f e r e n t l y  i n  Japan than i n  the US or 
i n  Europe. 'Ib understand the reasons for the Japanese outlook, it is 
important to b r i e f l y  review the basic concepts and strategies tha t  under l ie  
Japan's ove ra l l  econanic-industrial  planning. A t  the governmental l e v e l ,  this 
is primari ly  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of MITI. 
MITI's basic thinking is q u i t e  oam\on sense. It can be sunnarized as 
follows: 
o Japan produces less than 10% of the r a w  materials necessary to 
s u s t a i n  a modern developed econany. 
o As such, Japan mst iSpmt these r a w  materials. The a l t e r n a t i v e  is 
non-sunrival--or a t  least, non-survival as a modern soc ie ty .  
0 Ebr the same reason, Japan 1118t limit ttVe hprls of f in ished  
products,  and develop as much as possible a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r n a l  
-Y 
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o Tb pay f o r  the needed imports, Japan nust export sane th ing  i n  
exchange. The only  practical expor t ,  i n  s u f f i c i e n t  volume to cope 
with the demands of Japan ' s  i n t e r n a l  market, consists of finid& 
products. 
o 'Be h p r a t i v e  is to export products  that make m n e y  and that can be 
so ld  quickly and antinuously year  a f t e r  year. The choice of 
expor tab le  f in i shed  products  is not ove r ly  important: anything t h a t  
sells rap id ly  and cont inuously i n  the wrld marke t  w i l l  do. 
o The choice of what can best sell is performed by meticulous research 
of the m a r k e t s  of fore ign  coun t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the US-that 
r ep resen t s  the largest world buyer, 
o It has turned out thus f a r  that the rrost e f f e c t i v e  products  to 
a t t a i n  the desired end goal of "sales a t  a l l  costs" have been items 
such as hcane appl iances ,  automobiles,  e l e c t r o n i c  en ter ta inment  
devices ,  and i n  general the host of products  with which b e  are a l l  
f ami l i a r .  me provis ion  of product "quality" is considered by the 
Japanese to be no more than a sales tool : had the US ard Wrld 
marke ts  demanded law quality a t  very law price, the Japanese m u l d  
have tailored t h e i r  p roducts  accordingly.  
o In this con tex t ,  the achievement of "na t iona l  prestige" is a 
seoondary objective. So is the at ta i ranent  of "high-tech" capability 
per se. "High-tech" is only important i f  it con t r ibu te s  to expor t  
sales. In  f a c t ,  excess ive  use of high-tech could be a d e t e r r e n t  i n  
products  des t ined  for export, because of cost and maintenance 
problems. MITI's policy is " j u s t  enough hi-tech to sell the 
product". 
We rnte i n  passing that the p u r s u i t  of t h e  single-minded policy of 
"export a t  a l l  costs" has left the Japanese behind i n  several fields that 
require time for t h e i r  developnent: large aircraft, aircraft engines, 
sophisticated space systems, etc, The Japanese are w e l l  aware of th i s  fact, 
b u t  do not seem to be uver ly  concerned about it. 
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To implement the policy direction consistent with MITI'S thinking, a 
capable and responsive industry is needed. 
MITI thus plans which industries need particular strenghtening, and 
initiates actions accordingly. These actions take t h e  form of government 
contracts to nseedn industrial capabilities, bank guarantees to industries 
that develop preferred products on their own, similar. 
It is important to note that Japanese industry is predaninantly 
private: it resembles the structure of US industry far- more than European 
industry, which is predaninantly goverronent-owned. In Japan, the Covernment, 
through MITI, engages in an "enlightened" policy of stimulation of the key 
industries that are best suited to achieve the desired end-result of 
significant export sales. 
Turning now to space cannercialization, NIT.I is and will probably 
continue to be the drivirg Saroe in this area. 
As a matter of fact, both ISIS and NASm have repeatedly, officially 
stated that space aarmercialization does not lie within their charter nor that 
it is a particularly important goal, at least fran their standpoint. 
we note  however that these statements ought to be accepted with a grain 
Of salt. This is because, due to the interrelationships that exist m n g  
Japanese government agencies and industry, MITI can exert a variety of overt 
or subtle influences on the space program. For example, MITI can influence 
the design of particular space systems so as to utilize or replace hardware, 
software and techniques already developed by NASDA; it can influence other 
averntnent organizations to assist chartered Space Agencies in novel 
developrrents requiring special expertize; it can exert leadership on industry 
groups interested in space, that in turn can influence certain policies of 
NASDA and even of ISIS; it can provide strong inputs to STA that in turn can 
reflect upon specific NAsM programs and policies. 
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MITI'S philosophy in the area of space cannercialization can be 
smrized as follows. MITI is interested in: 
0 Space programs that are expected to be of direct value to the 
Japanese internal eool~llly in order to save on imports, e.g. , remote 
sensing that might allow increasing the fish catch-very important 
to Japan's internal econany; or telecamnunications that would 
circumvent the need to import comnunications hardware and know-how. 
0 Space programs that can assist Japanese industry in obtaining 
appropriate mquid-pro-quos' fran other nations, in particular the 
developing nations of Asia and the Pacific basin. We will discuss 
this more exhaustively when we address the ERS-1 remote sensing 
Program. 
0 Space programs that serve to Strengthen Japanese industry in 
becaning proficient at selected technologies that can later be 
turned into saleable export items. Examples are 'IwT's for 
Cammications Satellites, @tical Sensors, Synthetic Wrture 
Radars. WE? will discuss these later in this report. 
National prestige is not very important to MITI, except in cases where it 
is deemd to be significant as a tool to foster export sales. As such, 
"independence" is not an important issue, as it is in Exlrope. 
In this respect, MITI'S attitude is that if the Us wishes to reap world 
prestige fran its Space Station and Will foot mst of the bill, allawing Japan 
to use it for what it is worth, so much the better. All MITI wants to do is 
to use it for its own oamrercial purposes. 
It ought to be noted however that this attitude has changed sanewhat in 
the recent past, so that the national prestige ocmponent has acquired a 
sanewhat larger degree of imprtance-although still quite small with respect 
to the oarmercial objectives. Note also that MITI policies do not preclude a 
given cannercially-oriented space program f m n  also providing information of 
scientific value: the latter mstitutes good material for international 
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symposia, keeping Japan's name in front of the international carmunity, thus 
hopefully helping to achieve more sales. 
A major makness of MITI's in the amrnercial space areana is the dearth 
of a good market research: thus decisions are reached to a large extent based 
not so much on hard numbers as on the US example, and by following the US 
lead. As a matter of fact, all Japanese space programs, ccmnercial or 
otherwise, are deled upon what the US has accomplished in the past and is 
attempting to accQnplish mw. 
3.4 o3mnerciallporiented Space k t i v i t i e s  in Japan 
MITI considers the principal areas of space ccxrmercialization, or that 
are oriented towards space carmercialization,to be the following: 
o &mote Sensing of the Earth's resources 
o Micrcgravi ty 
Areas that are candidate for eventual carmercialization, should MITI so 
decide, are: 
o Launch Systens 
o Space Carmunications 
I;et us next address the highlights of these areas. 
Thus far, three carmercially-oriented space programs have been initiated 
in Japan: the !OS (Marine Observation Satellite); the -1, also called the 
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JERS-1 (Japan Earth &sources Satellite); and the ERSDAC (Earth m t e  sensing 
Data Application Center). 
The MS-1 (Narb  observation Satellite) was the first Japanese Earth 
Observation space system. Primed by Nippon Electric Corporation ( N E )  for 
NASDA, development started in 1980, and successful launch was effected in 
early 1987. 
m e  system's primary objective is the observation of the Oceans for the 
purpose of uncovering oceanic phenomena fmn which to infer the location and 
richness of fishing grounds. 
A secondary objective are land observations, for investigating mineral 
and fossil fuel resources, principally petroleum, and for performing general 
land surveys and inventories of crops. 
A third objective is the collection of data on sea ice, snowfall and 
water vapor content at the ocean surface and in the atmosphere-for purposes 
of eventually improving weather forecasts, principally €or ships at sea. 
MOS-1 is not a very advanced spacecraft. The Sensors are: 
o The Multispectral Electronic Scanning Radimter (MESSR), w i t h  a 
ground resolution of 50 meters in four visible and near-IR spectral 
bands (0.51 to 1.1 microns). The MESSR is essentially an adaptation 
of NASA's CCD ( Charge Coupled Detector ) Sensors; 
o A Visible and Thermal Infrared Radianeter (VTIR) ,  With resolution of 
900 meters in the visible, 2,700 in the Infrared, and using three 
spectral bands. %is is an adaptation of sensors that have flown on 
W ' s  weather satellites; 
0 'Ihe Microwave Scanning Radianeter (MSR), with resolution of 23 km in 
the 31 GHz band, 32 IQ1\ in the 24 GHz band. The MSR w a s  adapted 
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fmn US instrumentation, although Nippon Electric (NEC) has been 
active in the developnt of microwave radiometers since the late 
fifties. 
Thus far, Japan has received about 130 requests to use the M.3-1 data, 16 
of which were foreign. Not a very larye volume canpared to the 1972-76 
requests for NASA's ERTS program (well Over 1,000), but still encouraging. 
MITI's input to the Mos systan consisted essentially in fostering the 
development of the aenstxs, in order to stimulate Japanese industry to "cane 
up to par" with US technology. MITI's idea was the eventual sale of sensors 
to the world market-as well as producing them dcmestically to avoid their 
costly purchase abroad. 
The BIS-1 (Earth Satellite, also known as JERS-1, Japan Earth 
Wsources Satellite), is much more sophisticated than Mo5. Its primary 
objective is the search for deposits of petroleum. The second objective is 
the locatim of minerals. The primary sensor is a Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SARI 
In MITI's thinking, the ERS-1 program will accanplish two things: 
1. It will enable Japanese industry to come up to par with US 
industry in SAR technology. This will serve eventually to penetrate 
the US and European markets for sophisticated radar systems. 
2. It will provide useful information that can serve two  prposes: 
i) Assist the Japanese oil industry in locating more and better 
petroleum and mineral deposits in areas -re the industry already has 
concessions ( we note in passing that several concessions to the 
Japanese are now in existence within the US). 
ii) Form the basis for obtaininy new concessions in Third World 
countries, principally in the Pacific basin, by trading SAR findings 
for exploration concessions. MITI's expectation is that concessions 
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w i l l  be easier to obta in  i f  Japan can show t h a t  it has sophis t ica ted  
exploratian tools that can speed up the search f o r  productive areas, 
to the bene f i t  of both grantor and grantee of the  ooncession. 
'Ib achieve these objec t ives ,  ERS-1 is equipped with the  following two 
classes of pr inc ipa l  Sensors : 
1. A SAR with 25 to 30 mters ground reso lu t ion ,  operating a t  C- 
band, and capable of coveriry a swath 75 Km wide, under a l l  weather 
conditions 
2. A Visible and Near-Infrared Radianeter (VNIR), with a ground 
reso lu t ion  of 25 to 30 meters, operating i n  four bands in t h e  0.45 
to 0.95 micron spectral range; and covering a swath of about 100 Km. 
The Orbit w i l l  be c i r c u l a r ,  sun-synchronous, 570 Km high. 
The planning f o r  -1 began i n  1981 as part of NASDA's program. 
b u n c h  date is planned for 1991-92, by an H-1 launcher fm T a n e g a s h h .  
I n t h a t e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  the planning phase were the Japanese oi l  
industry and MITI. MITI has had a daninant input, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the choice 
of the sensors and of their spec i f ica t ions .  "he ac tua l  developnent of the 
sys tan  f a l l s  under NASI% 
MITI's thinking and dcminance is i l l u s t r a t e d  by t he  f a c t  that during the 
planning phase of -1, severa l  Japanese and foreign consultants recarmended 
a g a i n s t  use of the SAR, an the  grounds of high cost, mall impruvement mer 
optical sensors, and m to achieve a l l ~ t b s  operation. This is 
because petmleun and m i n e r a l  deposits do not exh ib i t  dynamic changes as is 
t h e  case f o r  crops-thus i f  clouds obscure one scene, Hit f o r  the next one. 
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MITI, after l i s t e n i n g  a t t e n t i v e l y  to al l  inputs ,  Overrode this advice i n  
favor of the ob jec t ive  of gaining know-hckJ of SAR technology on the part of 
the Japanese industry.  
The Earth Rmources Data Analysis Oenter (ERSWC) is a ground-based 
establishment s p e c i f i c a l l y  devoted to the processirq and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of ERS-1 
products, as e11 as to the inves t iga t ion  of promising petroleum and mineral 
deposits. Created i n  1982, ERSDAC's funding derives frun the Japanese oi l  
industry and fran MITI. Headquartered i n  Tokyo, ERSDAC is equipped with the 
best image-interpretation technologies now ava i l ab le ,  including a mainframe 
F'ujitsu m p u t e r  ( a copy of the IE3M series 4000, b u i l t  i n  Japan under 
l i c e n s e ) ,  mult icolor  high resolut ion.  recorders, and study qua r t e r s  f o r  about 
30 to 40 persons. ERSDAC is manned by petroleum and mineral geologists, p lus  
data processirq personnel. 
In t e rp re t a t ions  of ERS-1 data w i l l  be in tegra ted  by ERSINC wi th  a l l  other 
ava i l ab le  remotely sensed data: fran M E ,  SPOT, LANDSAT, and aircraft. 
3.4.2 Microgravity 
MITI has evidenced a strong interest in  microgravity,  in the be l i e f  that 
t h i s  technology can uncover important new products and pmcessess f o r  Japanese 
industry,  both f o r  the i n t e r n a l  Japanese market and f o r  export .  The p r inc ipa l  
product and process areas i n  which MITI and Japanese industxy have expressed 
i n t e r e s t  thus f a r  are: 
0 Glass and glass derivatives-for improVing the performance and 
lawering costs of optical system such as cameras, projectors, robotic 
v i s ion  devices  
o F i b e r  optics strands-to improve the performance of f i b e r  optic 
carmunications systans. Pr inc ipa l  properties sought are reduced 
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transmission loss (goal is 0.001 &/la), larger usable bandwidth (goal 
is 2,000 MHz or better), greater dynamic range (goal is at least 30 
db ) 
o Flexible, controllable light reflecting membranes obtained at low 
cost-for use in high-quality optical and electro-optical systems, 
such as self-focusing videocameras--and for attaining low-cost 
processes for producing high-quality aspherical lenses and/or 
reflectors 
o Materials for lasers--such as crystals and dopants, to enable the 
production of econanical industrial laser devices 
o Saniconductor materials, with particular enphasis on: i) low-work 
function, efficient photoconverters (solar cells) ; ii) high 
transconductance (high mbility) microelectronic devices 
o Organic crystals, to explore their potential in the electronic and 
biological industries 
Japan's private industry is significantly involved in microgravity 
planning. As indicated previously in this report, thirteen canpanies have 
formed the Institute for an uaaamed spaoe & p r h t s  Platfaom, a major 
object of which is the definition of which areas of microgravity 
experimentation w l d  yield the mst effective, saleable, and econanically 
producible products. 
The Japanese have experimented with short duration ballistic rockets with 
limited results. Advanced plans are being developed for exploiting the 
opportunities offered by NASA's Space Station for microgravity research, at 
low cost to the Japanese. 
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3.4.3 Launch Wicles 
Launch vehicles have historically represented the earliest Japanese 
developnent in space technology. Beginning in the 1950's with the Kappa 
Series, developnents have progressed through the Lambda, Mu, and Nu series, 
all designed and built at the University of Tokyo, within the department that 
later became ISAS, led by Professor Itokawa. Since these small launch 
vehicles were intended strictly for scientific satellite purposes, their early 
developnent phases involved no interest on the part of MITI. Their role in 
space commercialization has been negligible. 
Over the last five years, three main factors have awakened MITI's 
attention as regards comnercial potential of launch vehicles: i) the examples 
of US ELV's and Ariane in launching ocmnercial satellite payloads for a price; 
ii) the established world-wide market for telemunications satellites; and 
iii) the growing capability and hproving price/performance of Japanese launch 
vehicles. 
US aerospace plblications herald the near-tern entry of Japan into the 
launcher business. In reality, MITI is currently pondering the advisability 
of introducing Japanese launchers on the ocmnercial market. 
In this respect, MITI's basic questions are twofold: 
i) whether the volume of business, and the axresponding revenues, 
are sufficiently high to make the enterprise worthwhile frun the 
standpoint of the Japanese eoonany, especially in view of the already 
entrenched canpetition. Prestige is not an issue with MITI 
ii) whether such an enterprise should not rather be left at the 
discretion of Japanese private industry to pursue, if they so wish 
Note that the capturing of foreign exchange, critical to PRC and USSR, is not 
significant to MITI nor is the aspect of National prestige, that motivates the 
Europeans to push Ariane (even though the revenues are a "drop in the bucket" 
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with respect to Extrope's econanic needs). 
in MITI's hard-headed business attitude. 
Both are but minor considerations 
Recause of the above considerations, we cannot be sure at this time 
whether the Japanese will mount a concerted effort to cannercialize their H- 
series launch vehicle. The absence of such an effort would not however 
exclude the Japanese selling launchers to anybody willing to purchase them: 
Ilor muld it prohibit the Japanese entertaining joint ventures with foreign 
firms, where the Japanese could supply the vehicle, the other partner the 
launch services. 
3.4.4 CklmNnl 'cations 
The amrrercial telecarmunications satellite market has thus far been 
MITI has not attempted to develop and market a daninated by US manufacturers. 
cxmnercial Japanese version. 
As a matter of fact, as shown in Chart 21, most Japanese 
telecomnunications satellites have been experimental: only the YURI 2A has 
truly oarmercial applications, for TV broadcast to Japan's interior. 
Recent analyses by MITI indicate that the use of telecarmunications 
satellites for telephone service inside Japan may not represent a very 
worthwhile venture when canpared to employing the corresponding capital in 
widening the capacity of terrestrial systems. "he analyses indicates that 
this sanewhat pessimistic conclusion is due in part to the limited size of the 
Japanese territory (ccmrmnications satellites begin breaking even ecomically 
with respect to terrestrial systems above a certain distance); and in part to 
the availability of n e w  technologies, principally that of fiber optics 
transmission. 
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As a result, MITI has m~amrendal to the Japanese govemnt placing a 
moratorium on further plans to launch telecarmunications satellites for 
domestic use. We note in passing that similar conclusions were drawn for 
Europe by analogous studies performed by Fmerican and European consultants. 
In Europe m e r ,  the drive for prestiye overwhelms purely econanic 
considerations. 
The foregoing indicates that a future entry to the space 
telecannunications market on the part of Japan lies, if anything, still quite 
a bit in the future. 
3.5 Ranpe Planned Activities ard Intent 
The officially proposed Japanese space endeavors for the next decade and 
They include the developnent of a manned mini- 
No plans or 
sanewhat beyond are numerous. 
shuttle; of manned voyages to Mars; of Japan's own space station. 
proposals have been disclosed for the amnercial exploitation of space. 
We attribute this , i n  part, to the official postures of NASW and ISIS, 
of disinterest in space ocxrmercialization; and, in part, to the fact that MITI 
and its industrial councils are still pondering precisely what to do to make 
the industrial use of space a truly profitable venture, one whose products can 
redund to the advantage of the Japanese econany and, hopefully, will also be 
exportable. 
-king back, however, and based on several discussions with MITI 
executives, we can discern two consistent trends: the first is the 
exploitation of the -1 remote sensing satellite and the ERSN Data Center 
in the quest for petmleun and mineral concessions; the s e m  is a cautious 
betting on the prunise of microgravity. &s regards the latter, we believe 
that MITI will carefully watch foreign results, embark on a relatively modest 
program of Japanese experimentation and jump in strongly as soon as the 
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APPENDIX 
SALIENT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF 
PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE 
COMHERCIALLY-ORIENTED SPACE SYSTEMS 
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This Appendix shows, for each spacecraft or launcher 
vehicle: size, weight, power, stabilization, design life. 
For functional characteristics of the payloads and launch 
dates see Text. 
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o Dimensions: Hexagonal prism, 2.39 m (7.84 ft) wide (max. circumscribed 
diameter), 2.13 m ( 7  ft) tall. Total length with solar panels 
extended: 9.26 m (30.38 ft) 
o Weight in Orbit: 444 ~g (978.84 lbs) 
o mer Supply: Solar, 594 watts 
o Stabilization: 3 axes, gas propellant 
o Design Service life: 5 years 
o Dimensions: Hexagonal Prism, 2 m ( 6 . 5 6  ft) wide (max. circunscribed 
diameter), 2.5 m (8.2 ft) tall. Total length with Solar Panels 
extended: 13.8 m (45.27 ft) 
0 Wight in Orbit: 563 rcy (1,241 lbs) 
0 m e r  Supply: Solar, 955 watts 
o Stabilization: 3 axes, gas propellant 
o Design Service Life: 7 years 
7 7  
0 Dimensions: Hexagonal prism, 2.18 m (7.15 ft) wide (max. circunscribed 
diameter), 2.4 m (7.8 ft) tall. Total length with solar panels 
extended: 13.8 m (45.27 ft) 
o Wight in Orbit: 700 Kg (1,543 lbs.) 
o Fawer Supply: Solar, 1,000 watts 
o Stabilization: 3 axes, gas propellant 
o Design Service Life: 7 years for ECS-1,-2,-3, up to 9 yeais for ECS-4 
and Ecs-5 
0 Dimensions: Box shaped body, 2.1 m x 1.75 m (6.89 ft x 5.74 ft) 
wide, 3.5 m (11.48 ft) tall. Total length with solar panels extended: 
27 m (88.58 ft) 
o Wight in Orbit: 2,422 Kg (5,340 lbs) 
0 mer Supply: Solar, 3,300 watts 
o Stabilization: 3 axes, gas propellant 
o Design Service Life: 5 years 
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S t i l l  i n  e a r l y  design phase, expected c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  approximately 
those of O l ~ S  
S t i l l  in  e a r l y  design phase, expected c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  approaching those 
of us TDRS. 
S t i l l  i n  the e a r l y  planning phase. 
e f f e c t i v e  because of mall antenna diameter ( 3  m) and limited number- of 
channels (100 to 200). 
drawing board by 1988. 
Current version is non cost- 
More capable version expected to be on the  
~ l f A u J ( B v g M C L e  
o Dimensions: 47.7 m (157.4 f t )  high 
o Takeoff Wigh t  a t  Li f tof f :  210 tons (462,970 lbs) 
o Payload: 4,850 Kg (10,692 lbs) i n  200 )an, 5' inclimation LEK) 
1,825 Kg (4,023 lbs) i n  geosynchronous t r a n s f e r  orbit (GID) 
2,400 Kg (5,291 lbs) i n  polar sun-synchonous orbit (PW) 
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ARIANG2IAt"mIQE 
o Intermediate between Ariane 1 and Ariane 3 
ARIANE 3 rAuNca VEHICLE 
o Dimensions: 49 m (160.7 ft) high 
o Takeoff weight at liftoff: 237 tons (522,496 lbs)  
o Payload: 5,800 €Q (12,787 lbs) in 200km, 5 O  inclination LM) 
2,390 € 3 ~  (5,269 lbs) in geosynchronous transfer orbit (GID) 
3,150 Kg (6,945 lbs) in polar sun-synchronous orbit (PSSO) 
o Dimensions: 51 m (167.3 ft) high 
o Takeoff weight at liftoff: 274 tons (602,800 lbs) 
o Payload: 6,500 Kg (14,300 lbs) in 200 IQn, 5 O  inclination 
2,900 RJ ( 6,380 lbs) in geosynchronous transfer orbit (G'IU) 
3,600 Kg ( 7,920 lbs) in polar sun-synchonous orbit (PSSO) 
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o Dhensions: central section is a square prism, 2 m x 2 m (6.5 f t  x 
6.5 f t )  on the s ide ,  3.5 m (11.5 ft) tall. SAR, Total height including 
SAR antennas: 11.8 m (38.35 f t ) .  Total length with solar panels 
extended: 11.7 m (38 ft). SAR antenna dimensions: 10 m (32.5 f t )  long, 
1 m (3.25 f t )  wide 
o Wight  i n  Polar Sun-synchronous Orbit: 2,160 Kg (4,752 l b s )  
o Power supply: Solar, var iab le  power up to 2,600 w a t t s  max. 
o Stab i l iza t ion :  3 axes, gas propellant 
o Design Service Life: 3 years 
AWANQB) IAND AppLIcATIoNs stcmurm (ALAS) 
S t i l l  i n  the planning s tage  
m1BO P2 
Anologous to the US 03ES satellite 
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o Dimensions: Wadra ryu la r  box, 2.45 m, ( 8  f t )  wide, 4 m (13.1 f t )  t a l l ,  
total length w i t h  solar panels  extended: about 20 m (66  f t )  
o Weight i n  Orbit: 4,000 Kg (8,800 l b s ) .  Weight of experimental  
payload: 1,000 Kg (2,200 l b s )  
o Power Supply: Solar, 5,400 w a t t s  
o Other: Shu t t l e - canpa t ib l e  for deployment f run  and r e t r i e v a l  by S h u t t l e  
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